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Abstract
Several recent papers have introduced a periodic verification mech-
anism to detect silent errors in iterative solvers. Chen [PPoPP’13, pp.
167–176] has shown how to combine such a verification mechanism (a sta-
bility test checking the orthogonality of two vectors and recomputing the
residual) with checkpointing: the idea is to verify every d iterations, and
to checkpoint every c × d iterations. When a silent error is detected by
the verification mechanism, one can rollback to and re-execute from the
last checkpoint. In this paper, we also propose to combine checkpoint-
ing and verification, but we use algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT)
rather than stability tests. ABFT can be used for error detection, but
also for error detection and correction, allowing a forward recovery (and
no rollback nor re-execution) when a single error is detected. We intro-
duce an abstract performance model to compute the performance of all
schemes, and we instantiate it using the preconditioned conjugate gradi-
ent algorithm. Finally, we validate our new approach through a set of
simulations.
1 Introduction
Silent errors (or silent data corruptions) have become a significant concern in
HPC environments [1]. There are many sources of silent errors, from bit flips in
cache caused by cosmic radiations, to wrong results produced by the arithmetic
logic unit. The latter source becomes relevant when the computation is per-
formed in the low voltage modeto reduce the energy consumption in large-scale
computations. But the low levels of voltage dramatically reduces the depend-
ability of the system.
The key problem with silent errors is the detection latency: when a silent
error strikes, the corrupted data is not identified immediately, but instead only
when some numerical anomaly is detected in the application behavior. It is clear
that this detection can occur with an arbitrary delay. As a consequence, the de
facto standard method for resilience, namely checkpointing and recovery, cannot
be used directly. Indeed, the method of checkpointing and recovery applies to
fail-stop errors (e.g., hardware crashes): such errors are detected immediately,
and one can safely recover from the last saved snapshot of the application state.
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On the contrary, because of the detection latency induced by silent errors, it is
often impossible to know when the error struck, and hence to determine which
checkpoint (if any) is valid to safely restore the application state. Even if an
unlimited number of checkpoints could be kept in memory, there would remain
the problem of identifying a valid one.
In the absence of a resilience method, the only known remedy to silent errors
is to re-execute the application from scratch as soon as a silent error is detected.
On large-scale systems, the silent error rate grows linearly with the number of
components, and several silent errors are expected to strike during the execution
of a typical large-scale HPC application [2, 3, 4, 5]. The cost of re-executing the
application one or more times becomes prohibitive, and other approaches need
to be considered.
Several recent papers have proposed to introduce a verification mechanism
to be applied periodically in order to detect silent errors. These papers mostly
target iterative methods to solve sparse linear systems, which are natural can-
didates to periodic detection. If we apply the verification mechanism every, say,
d iterations, then we have the opportunity to detect the error earlier, namely
at most d − 1 iterations after the actual faulty iteration, thereby stopping the
progress of a flawed execution much earlier than without detection. However,
the cost of the verification may be non-negligible in front of the cost of one
iteration of the application, hence the need to trade off for an adequate value of
d. Verification can consist in testing the orthogonality of two vectors (cheap) or
recomputing the residual (cost of a sparse matrix-vector product, more expen-
sive). We survey several verification mechanisms in Section 2. Note that in all
these approaches a selective reliability model is enforced, where the parts of the
application that are not protected are assumed to execute in a reliable mode.
While verification mechanisms speed up the detection of silent errors, they
cannot provide correction, and thus they cannot avoid the re-execution of the ap-
plication from scratch. A solution is to combine checkpointing with verification.
If we apply the verification mechanism every d iterations, we can checkpoint
every c×d iterations, thereby limiting the amount of re-execution considerably.
A checkpoint is always valid because it is being preceded by a verification. If an
error occurs, it will be detected by one of the c verifications performed before
the next checkpoint. This is exactly the approach proposed by Chen [6] for a
variety of methods based on Krylov subspaces, including the widely used con-
jugate Gradient (CG) algorithm. Chen [6] gives an equation for the overhead
incurred by checkpointing and verification, and determines the best values of c
and d by finding a numerical solution of the equation. In fact, computing the
optimal verification and checkpoint intervals is a hard problem. In the case of
pure periodic checkpointing, closed-form approximations of the optimal period
have been given by Young [7] and Daly [8]. However, when combining check-
pointing and verification, the complexity of the problem grows. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no known closed-form formula, although a dynamic
programming algorithm to compute the optimal repartition of checkpoints and
verifications is available [9].
For linear algebra kernels, another widely used technique for silent error
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detection is algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT). The pioneering paper of
Huang and Abraham [10] describes an algorithm capable of detecting and cor-
recting a single silent error striking a dense matrix-matrix multiplication by
means of row and column checksums. ABFT protection has been success-
fully applied to dense LU [11], LU with partial pivoting [12], Cholesky [13]
and QR [14] factorizations, and more recently to sparse kernels like SpMxV
(matrix-vector product) and triangular solve [15]. The overhead induced by
ABFT is usually small, which makes it a good candidate for error detection at
each iteration of the CG algorithm.
The beauty of ABFT is that it can correct errors in addition to detecting
them. This comes at the price of an increased overhead, because several check-
sums are needed to detect and correct, while a single checksum is enough when
just detection is required. Still, being able to correct a silent error on the fly
allows for forward recovery. No rollback, recovery nor re-execution are needed
when a single silent error is detected at some iteration, because ABFT can cor-
rect it, and the execution can be safely resumed from that very same iteration.
Only when two or more silent errors strike within an iteration we do need to
rollback to the last checkpoint. In many practical situations, it is reasonable to
expect no more than one error per iteration, which means that most roll-back
operations can be avoided. In turn, this leads to less frequent checkpoints, and
hence less overhead.
The major contributions of this paper are an ABFT framework to detect
multiple errors striking the computation and a performance model that allows
to compare methods that combine verification and checkpointing. The verifi-
cation mechanism is capable of error detection, or of both error detection and
correction. The model tries to determine the optimal intervals for verification
and checkpointing, given the cost of an iteration, the overhead associated to
verification, checkpoint and recovery, and the rate of silent errors. Our abstract
model provides the optimal answer to this question, as a function of the cost of
all application and resilience parameters.
We instantiate the model using a CG kernel, preconditioned with a sparse
approximate inverse [16], and compare the performance of two ABFT-based ver-
ification mechanisms. We call the first scheme, capable of error detection only,
ABFT-Detection and the second scheme, which enhances the first one by pro-
viding single error correction as well, ABFT-Correction. Through numerical
simulations, we compare the performance of both schemes withOnline-Detec-
tion, the approach of Chen [6] (which we extend to recover from memory errors
by checkpointing the sparse matrix in addition to the current iteration vectors).
These simulations show that ABFT-Correction outperforms both Online-
Detection and ABFT-Detection for a wide range of fault rates, thereby
demonstrating that combining checkpointing with ABFT correcting techniques
is more efficient than pure checkpointing for most practical situations.
Our discussion focuses on the sequential execution of iterative methods. Yet,
all our techniques extend to parallel implementation based on the message pass-
ing paradigm (with using, e.g., MPI). In an implementation of SpMxV in such
a setting, the processing elements (or processors) hold a part of the matrix and
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the input vector, and hold a part of the output vector at the end. A recent
exposition of different algorithms can be found elsewhere [17]. Typically, the
processors perform scalar multiply operations on the local matrix and the in-
put vector elements, when all required vector elements have been received from
other processors. The implementations of the MPI standard guarantees cor-
rect message delivery, i.e., checksums are incorporated into the message so as
to prevent transmission errors (the receives can be done in-place and hence are
protected). However, the receiver will obviously get corrupted data if the sender
sends corrupted data. Silent error can indeed strike at a given processor during
local scalar multiply operations. Performing error detection and correction lo-
cally implies global error detection and correction for the SpMxV. Note that, in
this case, the local matrix elements can form a matrix which cannot be assumed
to be square in general (for some iterative solvers they can be). Furthermore,
the mean time between failures (MTBF) reduces linearly with the number of
processors. This is well-known for memoryless distributions of fault inter-arrival
times and remains true for arbitrary continuous distributions of finite mean [18].
Therefore, resilient local matrix vector multiplies are required for resiliency in
a parallel setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of related work. Section 3 provides background on ABFT techniques for the
PCG algorithm, and presents both theABFT-Detection andABFT-Correc-
tion approaches. Section 5 is devoted to the abstract performance model.
Section 6 reports numerical simulations comparing the performance of ABFT-
Detection, ABFT-Correction and Online-Detection. Finally, we out-
line main conclusions and directions for future work in Section 7.
2 Related work
We classify related work along the following topics: silent errors in general,
verification mechanisms for iterative methods, and ABFT techniques.
2.1 Silent errors
Considerable efforts have been directed at error-checking to reveal silent er-
rors. Error detection is usually very costly. Hardware mechanisms, such as
ECC memory, can detect and even correct a fraction of errors, but in practice
they are complemented with software techniques. The simplest technique is
triple modular redundancy and voting [19], which induces a costly verification.
For high-performance scientific applications, process replication (each process
is equipped with a replica, and messages are quadruplicated) is proposed in the
RedMPI library [20]. Elliot et al. [21] combine partial redundancy and check-
pointing, and confirm the benefit of dual and triple redundancy. The drawback
is that twice the number of processing resources is required (for dual redun-
dancy). A comprehensive list of general-purpose techniques and references is
provided by Lu et al. [22].
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Application-specific information can be very useful to enable ad-hoc solu-
tions, which dramatically decrease the cost of detection. Many techniques have
been advocated. They include memory scrubbing [23] and ABFT techniques
(see below).
As already stated, most papers assume on a selective reliability setting [24,
25, 26, 27]. It essentially means that one can choose to perform any operation
in reliable or unreliable mode, assuming the former to be error-free but en-
ergy consuming and the latter to be error-prone but preferable from an energy
consumption point of view.
2.2 Iterative methods
Iterative methods offer a wide range of ad-hoc approaches. For instance, in-
stead of duplicating the computation, Benson et al. [28] suggest coupling a
higher-order with a lower-order scheme for PDEs. Their method only detects
an error but does not correct it. Self-stabilizing corrections after error detec-
tion in the CG method are investigated by Sao and Vuduc [27]. Heroux and
Hoemmen [29] design a fault-tolerant GMRES capable of converging despite
silent errors. Bronevetsky and de Supinski [30] provide a comparative study of
detection costs for iterative methods.
As already mentioned, a nice instantiation of the checkpoint and verification
mechanism that we study in this paper is provided by Chen [6], who deals with
sparse iterative solvers. For PCG, the verification amounts to checking the
orthogonality of two vectors and to recomputing and checking the residual (see
Section 3 for further details).
As already mentioned, our abstract performance model is agnostic of the
underlying error-detection technique and takes the cost of verification as an
input parameter to the model.
2.3 ABFT
The very first idea of algorithm-based fault tolerance for linear algebra kernels
is given by Huang and Abraham [10]. They describe an algorithm capable of
detecting and correcting a single silent error striking a matrix-matrix multipli-
cation by means of row and column checksums. This germinal idea is then elab-
orated by Anfinson and Luk [31], who propose a method to detect and correct
up to two errors in a matrix representation using just four column checksums.
Despite its theoretical merit, the idea presented in their paper is actually appli-
cable only to relatively small matrices, and is hence out of our scope. Bosilca
et al. [32] and Du et al. [11] present two relatively recent survey.
The problem of algorithm-based fault-tolerance for sparse matrices is inves-
tigated by Shantharam et al. [15], who suggest a way to detect a single error in
an SpMxV at the cost of a few additional dot products. Sloan et al. [33] suggest
that this approach can be relaxed using randomization schemes, and propose
several checksumming techniques for sparse matrices. These techniques are less
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effective than the previous ones, not being able to protect the computation from
faults striking the memory, but provide an interesting theoretical insight.
3 CG-ABFT
We streamline our discussion on the CG method, however, the techniques that
we describe are applicable to any iterative solver that use sparse matrix vector
multiplies and vector operations. This list includes many of the non-stationary
iterative solvers such as CGNE, BiCG, BiCGstab where sparse matrix transpose
vector multiply operations also take place. In particular, we consider a PCG
variant where the application of the preconditioner reduces to the computation
of two SpMxV with triangular matrices [16], which are a sparse factorization of
an approximate inverse of the coefficient matrix. In fact, the model discussed
in this paper can be profitably employed for any sparse inverse preconditioner
that can be applied by means of one or more SpMxV.
We first provide a background on the CG method and overview both Chen’s
stability tests [6] and our ABFT protection schemes.
Algorithm 1 The PCG algorithm.
Input: A,M ∈ Rn×n,b,x0 ∈ R
n, ε ∈ R
Output: x ∈ Rn : ‖Ax− b‖ ≤ ε
1: r0 ← b−Ax0;
2: z0 ←M
⊺Mr0;
3: p0 ← z0;
4: i← 0;
5: while ‖ri‖ > ε (‖A‖ · ‖r0‖+ ‖b‖)
6: q← Api;
7: αi ← ‖ri‖
2 /p⊺i q;
8: xi+1 ← xi + αpi;
9: ri+1 ← ri − αq;
10: zi+1 ←M
⊺Mri+1;
11: β ← ‖ri+1‖
2 / ‖ri‖
2;
12: pi+1 ← zi+1 + β pi;
13: i← i+ 1;
14: end while
15: return xi;
The code for the variant of the PCG method we use is shown in Algorithm 1.
The main loop features three sparse matrix-vector multiply, two inner products
(for p⊺i q and ‖ri+1‖
2), and three vector operations of the form axpy.
Chen’s stability tests [6] amount to checking the orthogonality of vectors
pi+1 and q, at the price of computing
p
⊺
i+1
q
‖pi+1‖‖qi‖
, and to checking the residual
at the price of an additional SpMxV operation Axi − b. The dominant cost of
these verifications is the additional SpMxV operation.
Our only modification to Chen’s original approach is that we also save the
sparse matrix A in addition to the current iteration vectors. This is needed
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when a silent error is detected: if this error comes for a corruption in data
memory, we need to recover with a valid copy of the data matrix A. This holds
for the three methods under study, Online-Detection, ABFT-Detection
and ABFT-Correction, which have exactly the same checkpoint cost.
We now give an overview of our own protection and verification mechanisms.
We use ABFT techniques to protect the SpMxV, its computations (hence the
vector q), the matrix A and the input vector pi. Since ABFT protection for
vector operations is as costly as repeated computation, we use triple modular
redundancy (TMR) for them for simplicity.
Although theoretically possible, constructing ABFT mechanism to detect up
to k errors is practically not feasible for k > 2. The same mechanism can be
used to correct up to ⌊k/2⌋. Therefore, we focus on detecting up to two errors
and correcting the error if there was only one. That is, we detect up to two
errors in the computation q ← Api (two entries in q are faulty), or in pi, or
in the sparse representation of the matrix A. With TMR, we assume that the
errors in the computation are not overly frequent so that two out of three are
correct (we assume errors do not strike the vector data here). Our fault-tolerant
PCG versions thus have the following ingredients: ABFT to detect up to two
errors in the SpMxV and correct the error, if there was only one; TMR for vector
operations; and checkpoint and roll-back in case errors are not correctable.
We assume the selective reliability model in which all checksums and check-
sum related operations are non-faulty, also the tests for the orthogonality checks
are non-faulty.
4 ABFT-SpMxV
Here, we discuss the proposed ABFT method for the SpMxV (combining ABFT
with checkpointing is described later in Section 5.2). The proposed ABFT mech-
anisms are described for detecting single errors (Section 4.1), multiple errors
(Section 4.2), and correcting a single error (Section 4.3).
4.1 Single error detection
The overhead of the standard single error correcting ABFT technique is too
high for the sparse matrix-vector product case. Shantharam et al. [15] propose
a cheaper ABFT-SpMxV algorithm that guarantees the detection of a single
error striking either the computation or the memory representation of the two
input operands (matrix and vector). Because their results depend on the sparse
storage format adopted, throughout the paper we will assume that sparse ma-
trices are stored in the compressed storage format by rows (CSR), that is by
means of three distinct arrays, namely Colid ∈ Nnnz(A), Val ∈ Rnnz(A) and
Rowidx ∈ Nn+1 [34, Sec. 3.4]). Here nnz(A) is the number of non-zero entries
in A.
Shantharam et al. can protect y ← Ax, where A ∈ Rn×n and x,y ∈ Rn.
7
To perform error detection, they rely on a column checksum vector c defined by
cj =
n∑
i=0
ai,j (1)
and an auxiliary copy x′ of the x vector. After having performed the actual
SpMxV, to validate the result, it suffices to compute
∑n
i=1 yi, c
⊺x and c⊺x′,
and to compare their values. It can be shown [15] that in case of no errors,
these three quantities carry the same value, whereas if a single error strikes
either the memory or the computation, one of them must differ from the other
two. Nevertheless, this method requires A to be strictly diagonally dominant,
a condition that seems to restrict too much the practical applicability of their
method. Shantharam et al. need this condition to ensure detection of errors
striking an entry of x corresponding to a zero checksum column of A. We
further analyze that case and show how to overcome the issue without imposing
any restriction on A.
A nice way to characterize the problem is expressing it in geometrical terms.
Consider the computation of a single entry of the checksum as
(w⊺A)j =
n∑
i=1
wiai,j = w
⊺Aj ,
where w ∈ Rn denotes the weight vector and Aj the j-th column of A. Let
us now interpret such an operation as the result of the scalar product 〈·, ·〉 :
R
n × Rn → R defined by 〈u,v〉 7→ u⊺v. It is clear that a checksum entry is
zero if and only if the corresponding column of the matrix is orthogonal to the
weight vector. In (1), we have chosen w to be such that wi = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
in order to make the computation easier. Let us see now what happens without
this restriction.
The problem reduces to finding a vector w ∈ Rn that is not orthogonal to
any vector out of a basis B = {b1, . . . ,bn} of R
n – the rows of the input matrix.
Each of these n vectors is perpendicular to a hyperplane hi of R
n, and w does
not verify the condition
〈w,bi〉 6= 0, (2)
for any i, if and only if it lies on hi. Since the Lebesgue measure in R
n of an
hyperplane of Rn itself is zero, the union of these hyperplanes is measurable
and has measure 0. Therefore, the probability that a vector w randomly picked
in Rn does not satisfy condition (2) for any i is zero.
Nevertheless, there are many reasons to consider zero checksum columns.
First of all, when working with finite precision, the number of elements in Rn
one can have is finite, and the probability of randomly picking a vector that
is orthogonal to a given one could be larger than zero. Moreover, a coefficient
matrix usually comes from the discretization of a physical problem, and the
distribution of its columns cannot be considered as random. Finally, using a
randomly chosen vector instead of (1, . . . , 1)⊺ increases the number of required
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floating point operations, causing a growth of both the execution time and
the number of rounding errors (see Section 6). Therefore, we would like to
keep w = (1, . . . , 1)⊺ as the vector of choice, in which case we need to protect
SpMxV with matrices having zero column sums. There are many matrices with
this property, for example the Laplacian matrices of graphs [35, Ch. 1].
Algorithm 2 Shifting checksum algorithm.
Input: A ∈ Rn×n, x ∈ Rn
Output: y ∈ Rn such that y = Ax or the detection of a single error
1: x′ ← x;
2: [w, c, k, cr] = computeChecksum(A);
3: return SpMxV(A, x, x′, w, c, k, cr);
4: function computeChecksum(A)
5: Generate w ∈ Rn+1;
6: w ← w1:n;
7: c ← w⊺A;
8: if min(| c |) = 0 ;
9: Find k that verifies (4);
10: c ← c+ k;
11: cr ← w
⊺
Rowindex ;
12: return w, c, k, cr;
13: function SpMxV(A, x, x′, w, c, k, cr)
14: w ← w1:n;
15: sr ← 0;
16: for i← 1 to n
17: yi ← 0;
18: sr ← sr + Rowindex i;
19: for j ← Rowindex i to Rowindex i+1 − 1
20: ind ← Colidj ;
21: yi ← yi + Valj · xind;
22: yn+1 ← k w
⊺x′;
23: cy ← w
⊺y;
24: dx ← c
⊺x;
25: dx′ ← c
⊺x′;
26: dr ← cr − sr;
27: if dx = 0 ∧ dx′ = 0 ∧ dr = 0
28: return y1:n;
29: else
30: error (“Soft error is detected”);
In Algorithm 2, we propose an ABFT SpMxV method that uses weighted
checksums and does not require the matrix to be strictly diagonally dominant.
The idea is to compute the checksum vector and then shift it by adding to
all entries a constant value chosen so that all elements of the new vector are
different from zero. We give the generalized result in Theorem 1.
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Theorem 1 (Correctness of Algorithm 2). Let A ∈ Rn×n be a square matrix,
let x,y ∈ Rn be the input and output vector respectively, and let x′ = x. Let us
assume that the algorithm performs the computation
y˜ ← A˜x˜, (3)
where A˜ ∈ Rn×n and x˜ ∈ Rn are the possibly faulty representations of A and x
respectively, while y˜ ∈ Rn is the possibly erroneous result of the sparse matrix-
vector product. Let us also assume that the encoding scheme relies on
1. an auxiliary checksum vector
c =
[
n∑
i=1
ai,1 + k, . . . ,
n∑
i=1
ai,n + k
]
,
where k is such that
cj =
n∑
i=1
ai,j + k 6= 0, (4)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
2. an auxiliary checksum yn+1 = k
∑n
i=i x˜i,
3. an auxiliary counter sr initialized to 0 and updated at runtime by adding
the value of the hit element each time the Rowindex array is accessed (line
20 of Algorithm 2),
4. an auxiliary checksum cr =
∑n
i=1 Rowindex i ∈ N.
Then, a single error in the computation of the SpMxV causes one of the following
conditions to fail:
i. c⊺x˜ =
∑n+1
i=1 y˜i,
ii. c⊺x′ =
∑n+1
i=1 y˜i,
iii. sr = cr.
Proof. We will consider three possible cases, namely
a. a faulty arithmetic operation during the computation of y,
b. a bit flip in the sparse representation of A,
c. a bit flip in an element of of x.
Case a. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the error has struck
at the pth position of y, which implies y˜i = yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with i 6= p and
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y˜p = yp+ε, where ε ∈ R\{0} represents the value of the error that has occurred.
Summing up the elements of y˜ gives
n+1∑
i=1
y˜i =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ai,j x˜j + k
n∑
j=1
x˜j + ε
=
n∑
j=1
cj x˜j + ε
= c⊺x˜+ ε,
that violates condition (i).
Case b. A single error in the A matrix can strike one of the three vectors
that constitute its sparse representation:
• a fault in Val that alters the value of an element ai,j implies an error in the
computation of y˜i, which leads to the violation of the safety condition (i)
because of (a),
• a variation in Colid can zero out an element in position ai,j shifting its
value in position ai,j′ , leading again to an erroneous computation of y˜i,
• a transient fault in Rowindex entails an incorrect value of sr and hence a
violation of condition (iii).
Case c. Let us assume, without loss of generality, an error in position p of
x. Hence we have that x˜i = xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n with i 6= p and x˜p = xp + ε, for
some ε ∈ R \ {0}. Noting that x = x′, the sum of the elements of y˜ gives
n+1∑
i=1
y˜i =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ai,j x˜j + k
n∑
j=1
x˜j
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ai,jxj + k
n∑
j=1
xj + ε
n∑
i=1
ai,p + εk
=
n∑
j=1
cjxj + ε
(
n∑
i=1
ai,p + k
)
= c⊺x′ + ε
(
n∑
i=1
ai,p + k
)
,
that violates (ii) since
∑n
i=1 ai,p + k 6= 0 by definition of k.
Let us remark that computeChecksum in Algorithm 2 does not require the
input vector x of SpMxV as an argument. Therefore, in the common scenario
of many SpMxV with the same matrix, it is enough to invoke it once to protect
several matrix-vector multiplications. This observation will be crucial when
discussing the performance of these checksumming techniques.
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Table 1: Overhead comparison for Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3. Here n denotes
the size of the matrix and n′ the number of null sum columns.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm 3
initialization of y n n
computation of yn+1 n -
SpMxV overhead - n′
checksum check 2n 2n+ 2n′
computation of cy and cŷ n n+ n
′
computation of y + ŷ - n′
Total SpMxV overhead 5n 4n+ 5n′
Shifting the sum checksum vector by an amount is probably the simplest
deterministic approach to relax the strictly diagonal dominance hypothesis, but
it is not the only one. An alternative solution is described in Algorithm 3, which
basically exploits the distributive property of matrix multiplication over matrix
addition. The idea is to split the original matrix A into two matrices of the
same size, A and Â, such that no column of either matrix has a zero checksum.
Two standard ABFT multiplications, namely y ← Ax and ŷ ← Ax̂, are then
performed. If no error occurs neither in the first nor in the second computation,
the sum of y and ŷ is computed in reliable mode and then returned. Let us
note that, as we expect the number of non-zeros of Â to be much smaller than
n, we store sparsely both the checksum vector of Â and the ŷ vector.
We do not write down an extended proof of the correctness of this algorithm,
and limit ourselves to a short sketch. We consider the same three cases as
in the proof of Theorem 1, without introducing any new idea. An error in
the computation of y or ŷ can be detected using the dot product between the
corresponding column checksum and the x error. An error in A can be detected
by either cr or an erroneous entry in y or ŷ, as the matrix loop structure of the
sparse multiplication algorithm has not been changed. Finally, an error in the
pth component of x would make the sum of the entries of y and ŷ differ from
c⊺x′ and ĉ⊺x′, respectively.
The evaluation of the performance of the two algorithms, though straight-
forward from the point of view of the computational cost, has to be carefully
assessed in order to devise a valid and practical trade-off between Algorithm 2
and Algorithm 3.
In both cases computeChecksum introduces an overhead of O (nnz(A)),
but the shift version should in general be faster containing less assignments than
its counterpart, and this changes the constant factor hidden by the asymptotic
notation. Nevertheless, as we are interested in performing many SpMxV with a
same matrix, this pre-processing overhead becomes negligible.
The function SpMxV has to be invoked once for each multiplication, and
hence more care is needed. Copying x and initializing y both require n oper-
ations, and the multiplication is performed in time O (nnz(A)), but the split
version pays an n′ more to read the values of the sparse vector b. The cost
12
Algorithm 3 Splitting checksum algorithm.
Input: A ∈ Rn×n, x ∈ Rn
Output: y ∈ Rn such that y = Ax or the detection of a single error
1: [c, k, cr] = computeChecksum(A);
2: return SpMxV(A, x, c, ĉ, b, cr);
3: function computeChecksum(A)
4: c,m← 0;
5: for i← 1 to nnz(A)
6: ind ← Colid i;
7: cind ← cind + Val i;
8: mind ← i;
9: k ← 0;
10: for i← 1 to n
11: if ci = 0 ∧mi 6= 0
12: bmi ← true;
13: ĉi ← Valmi ;
14: ci ← ci − ĉi;
15: cr ←
∑n
i=1 Rowindex i;
16: return c, ĉ,b, cr;
17: function SpMxV(A, x, c, ĉ, b, cr)
18: x′ ← x;
19: for i← 1 to n
20: yi ← 0;
21: sr ← 0;
22: for i← 1 to n
23: sr ← sr + Rowindex i;
24: for j ← Rowindex i to Rowindex i+1 − 1
25: ind ← Colidj ;
26: if bj
27: ŷi ← ŷi +Val j · xind;
28: else
29: yi ← yi +Val j · xind;
30: cy ←
∑n
i=1 yi; cŷ ←
∑n
i=1 ŷi;
31: dx ← c
⊺x− cy ; dx̂ ← ĉ
⊺x− cŷ ;
32: dx′ ← c
⊺x′ − cy ; dx̂′ ← c˜
⊺x′ − cŷ ;
33: dr ← cr − sr;
34: if dx = 0 ∧ dx′ = 0 ∧ dx˜ = 0 ∧ dx˜′ = 0 ∧ dr = 0
35: return y + ŷ;
36: else
37: error (“Soft error is detected”);
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of the verification step depends instead on the number of zeroes of the original
checksum vector, that is also the number of non-zero elements of the sparse
vector ĉ. Let us call this quantity n′. Then the overhead is 4n for the shifting
and 3n+ 3n′ for the splitting, that requires also the sum of two sparse vectors
to return the result. Hence, as summarized in Table 1, the two methods bring
different overhead into the computation. Comparing them, it is immediate to
see that the shifting method is cheaper when
n′ >
n
5
,
while it has more operations to do when the opposite inequality holds. For
the equality case, we can just choose to use the first method because of the
cheaper preprocessing phase. In view of this observation, it is possible to devise
a simple algorithm that exploits this trade-off to achieve better performance. It
suffices to compute the checksum vector of the input matrix, count the number
of non-zeros and choose which detection method to use accordingly.
We also note that by splitting the matrix A into say ℓ pieces and checksum-
ming each piece separately we can possibly protect A from up to ℓ errors, by
protecting each piece against a single error (obviously the multiple errors should
hit different pieces).
4.2 Multiple error detection
With some effort, the shifting idea in Algorithm 2 can be extended to detect
errors striking a single SpMxV. Let us consider the problem of detecting up to
k errors in the computation of y ← Ax introducing an overhead of O (kn). Let
k weight vectors w(1), . . . ,w(k) ∈ Rn be such that any sub-matrix of
W =
[
w(1) w(2) . . . w(k)
]
has full rank. To build our ABFT scheme let us note that, if no error occurs,
for each weight vector w(ℓ) it holds that
w(ℓ)
⊺
A =
[
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,1, . . . ,
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,n
]
,
and hence that
w(ℓ)
⊺
Ax =
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,1x1 + · · ·+
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,nxn
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,jxj .
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Similarly, the sum of the entries of y weighted with the same w(ℓ) is
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i yi = w
(ℓ)
1 y1 + · · ·+ w
(ℓ)
n yn
= w
(ℓ)
1
n∑
j=1
a1,jxj + · · ·+ w
(ℓ)
n
n∑
j=1
an,jxj
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,jxj ,
and we can conclude that
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i yi =
(
w(ℓ)
⊺
A
)
x,
for any w(ℓ) with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k.
To convince ourself that with these checksums it is actually possible to detect
up to k errors, let us suppose that k′ errors, with k′ ≤ k, occur in positions
p1, . . . , pk′ , and let us denote by y˜ the faulty vector where y˜pi = ypi + εpi for
εpi ∈ R \ {0} and 1 ≤ i ≤ k
′ and y˜i = yi otherwise. Then for each weight vector
we have
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i y˜i −
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i yi =
k′∑
j=1
w(ℓ)pj εpj .
Said otherwise, the occurrence of the k′ errors is not detected if and only if, for
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, all the εpi respect
k′∑
j=1
w(ℓ)pj εpj = 0 . (5)
We claim that there cannot exist a vector (εp1 , . . . , εp′k)
⊺ ∈ Rk
′
\ {0} such that
all the conditions in (5) are simultaneously verified. These conditions can be
expressed in a more compact way as a linear system
w
(1)
p1 · · · w
(1)
pk′
...
. . .
...
w
(k)
p1 · · · w
(k)
pk′


εp1
...
εpk′
 =
0...
0
 .
Denoting by W∗ the coefficient matrix of this system, it is clear that the
errors cannot be detected if only if (εp1 , . . . εpk′ )
⊺ ∈ ker(W∗) \ {0}. Because of
the properties of W, we have that rk(W∗) = k. Moreover, it is clear that the
rank of the augmented matrix
w
(1)
p1 · · · w
(1)
pk′
...
. . .
...
w
(k)
p1 · · · w
(k)
pk′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
...
0

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is k as well. Hence, by means of the Rouche´–Capelli theorem, the solution
of the system is unique and the null space of W∗ is trivial. Therefore, this
construction can detect the occurrence of k′ errors during the computation of
y by comparing the values of the weighted sums y⊺w(ℓ) with the result of the
dot product (w(ℓ)
⊺
A)x, for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k.
However, to get a true extension of the algorithm described in the previous
section, we also need to make it able to detect errors that strike the sparse
representation of A and that of x. The first case is simple, as the k errors can
strike the Val or Colid arrays, leading to at most k errors in y˜, or in Rowindex ,
where they can be caught using k weighted checksums of the Rowindex vector.
Detection in x is much trickier, since neither the algorithm just described
nor a direct generalization of Algorithm 2 can manage this case. Nevertheless,
a proper extension of the shifting technique is still possible. Let us note that
there exists a matrix M ∈ Rk×n such that
W⊺A+M = W.
The elements of such an M can be easily computed, once that the checksum
rows are known. Let x˜ ∈ Rn be the faulty vector, defined by
x˜i =
 xi + εpi , 1 ≤ i ≤ k
′,
xi otherwise.
for some k′ ≤ k, and let us define y˜ = Ax˜. Now, let us consider a checksum
vector x′ ∈ Rn such that x′ = x and let assume that it cannot be modified by
a transient error. For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, it holds that
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i y˜i +
n∑
j=1
m
ℓ,j
x˜j =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,jxj +
k′∑
i=1
εpi
 n∑
j=1
w
(ℓ)
j aj,pi
+ n∑
j=1
m
ℓ,j
xj +
k′∑
i=1
εpiml,pi
=
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,jxj +
n∑
j=1
m
ℓ,j
xj +
k′∑
i=1
εpi
 n∑
j=1
w
(ℓ)
j aj,pi
+m
l,pi

=
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,j
)
xj +
n∑
j=1
m
ℓ,j
xj +
k′∑
i=1
εpiw
(ℓ)
pi
=
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
w
(ℓ)
i ai,j +mℓ,j
)
xj +
k′∑
i=1
εpiw
(ℓ)
pi
= w(ℓ)
⊺
x+
k′∑
i=1
εpiw
(ℓ)
pi
= w(ℓ)
⊺
x
′ +
k′∑
i=1
εpiw
(ℓ)
pi .
Therefore, an error is not detected if and only if the linear system
w
(1)
p1 · · · w
(1)
pk′
...
. . .
...
w
(k)
p1 · · · w
(k)
pk′


εp1
...
εpk′
 =
0...
0

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has a non-trivial solution. But we have already seen that such a situation can
never happen, and we can thus conclude that our method, whose pseudocode
we give in Algorithm 4, can also detect up to k errors occurring in x. Therefore,
we have proven the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Correctness of Algorithm 4). Let us consider the same notation
as in Theorem 1. Let W ∈ Rn+1×n be a matrix such that any square submatrix
is full rank, and let us denote by W ∈ Rn×n the matrix of its first n rows. Let
us assume an encoding scheme that relies on
1. an auxiliary checksum matrix C = (W⊺A)
⊺
,
2. an auxiliary checksum matrix M = W −C,
3. a vector of auxiliary counters sRowindex initialized to the null vector and
updated at runtime as in lines 16 – 17 of Algorithm 4),
4. an auxiliary checksum vector cRowindex = W
⊺Rowindex .
Then, up to k errors striking the computation of y or the memory locations that
store A or x, cause one of the following conditions to fail:
i. W⊺y = C⊺x,
ii. W⊺ (x′ − y),
iii. sRowindex = cRowindex.
Let us note that we have just shown that our algorithm can detect up to k
errors striking only A, or only x or only the computation. Nevertheless, this
result holds even when the errors are distributed among the possible cases, as
long as at most k errors rely on the same checkpoint.
It is clear that the execution time of the algorithm depends on both nnz(A)
and k. For the computeChecksum function, the cost is, assuming that the
weight matrix W is already known, O (k nnz(A)) for the computation of C,
and O (kn) for the computation of M and cRowindex . Hence the number of per-
formed operations is O (k nnz(A)). The overhead added to the SpMxV depends
instead on the computation of four checksum matrices that lead to a number of
operations that grows asymptotically as kn.
4.3 Single error correction
We now discuss single error correction, using Algorithm 4 as a reference. We de-
scribe how a single error striking either memory or computation can be not only
detected but also corrected at line 27. We use only two checksum vectors, that
is, we describe correction of single errors assuming that two errors cannot strike
the same SpMxV. By the end of the section, we will generalize this approach
and discuss how single error correction and double error detection can be per-
formed concurrently by exploiting three linearly independent checksum vectors.
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Algorithm 4 Shifting checksum algorithm for k errors detection.
Input: A ∈ Rn×n, x ∈ Rn
Output: y ∈ Rn such that y = Ax or the detection of up to k errors
1: x′ ← x
2: [W,C,M, c˜] = computeChecksums(A, k);
3: return SpMxV(A, x, x′, W, C, M, k, c˜);
4: function computeChecksums(A, k)
5: Generate W =
[
w(1) . . .w(k)
]
∈ Rn+1×n;
6: W ←W1:n,∗ ∈ R
n×k
7: C⊺ ← W⊺A;
8: M←W −C;
9: cRowindex ←W
⊺
Rowindex ;
10: return W,C,M, cRowindex;
11: function SpMxV(A, x, x′, W, C, M, k, c˜)
12: W ←W1:n,∗ ∈ R
n×k
13: s˜← [0, . . . , 0];
14: for i← 1 to n
15: yi ← 0;
16: for j = 1 to k
17: s˜j ← s˜j + wijRowindex i;
18: for j ← Rowindex i to Rowindex i+1 − 1
19: ind ← Colidj ;
20: yi ← yi + Valj · xind;
21: dx ←W
⊺y −C⊺x;
22: dx′ ←W
⊺ (x′ − y)−M⊺x;
23: dr ← c˜− s˜;
24: if dx = 0 ∧ dx′ = 0 ∧ dr = 0
25: return y;
26: else
27: error (“Soft errors are detected”);
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Whenever a single error is detected, regardless of its location (computation or
memory), it is corrected by means of a succession of various steps. When one
or more errors are detected, the correction mechanism tries to determine their
multiplicity and, in case of a single error, what memory locations have been
corrupted or what computation has been miscarried. Errors are then corrected
using the values of the checksums and, if need be, partial recomputations of the
result are performed.
As we did for multiple error detection, we require that any 2× 2 submatrix
of W ∈ Rn×2 has full rank. The simplest example of weight matrix having this
property is probably
W =

1 1
1 2
1 3
...
...
1 n
 .
To detect errors striking Rowidx , we compute the ratio ρ of the second
component of dr to the first one, and check whether its distance from an integer
is smaller than a certain threshold parameter ε. If this distance is smaller, the
algorithm concludes that the σth element, where σ = Round(ρ) is the nearest
integer to ρ, of Rowidx is faulty, performs the correction by subtracting the first
component of dr from Rowidx σ, and recomputes yσ and yσ−1, if the error in
Rowindexσ is a decrement; or yσ+1 if it was an increment. Otherwise, it just
emits an error.
The correction of errors striking Val , Colid and the computation of y are
performed together. Let now ρ be the ratio of the second component of dx to
the first one. If ρ is near enough to an integer σ, the algorithm computes the
checksum matrix C′ = W⊺A and considers the number z
C˜
of non-zero columns
of the difference matrix C˜ = |C−C′|. At this stage, three cases are possible:
• If z
C˜
= 0, then the error is in the computation of yσ, and can be corrected
by simply recomputing this value.
• If z
C˜
= 1, then the error has struck an element of Val . Let us call f the
index of the non-zero column of C˜. The algorithm finds the element of
Val corresponding to the entry at row σ and column f of A and corrects
it by using the column checksums much like as described for Rowidx .
Afterwards, yd is recomputed to fix the result.
• If z
C˜
= 2, then the error concerns an element of Colid . Let us call f1 and
f2 the index of the two non-zero columns and m1, m2 the first and last
elements of Colid corresponding to non-zeros in row σ. It is clear that
there exists exactly one index m∗ between m1 and m2 such that either
Colidm∗ = f1 or Colidm∗ = f2. To correct the error it suffices to switch
the current value of Colidm∗ , i.e., putting Colidm∗ = f2 in the former case
and Colidm∗ = f1 in the latter. Again, yσ has to be recomputed.
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• if z
C˜
> 2, then errors can be detected but not corrected, and an error is
emitted.
To correct errors striking x, the algorithm computes ρ, that is the ratio of the
second component of dx′ to the first one, and checks that the distance between
d and the nearest integer σ is smaller than ε. Provided that this condition is
verified, the algorithm computes the value of the error τ =
∑n
i=1 xi − cxσ and
corrects xσ = xσ − τ . The result is updated by subtracting from y the vector
yτ = Axτ , where xτ ∈ Rn×n is such that xτσ = τ and x
τ
i = 0 otherwise.
Let us now investigate how detection and correction can be combined and
let us give some details about the implementation of ABFT-Correction as
defined in Section 3. Indeed, note that double errors could be shadowed when
using Algorithm 2, although the probability of such an event is negligible.
Let us restrict ourselves to an easy case, without considering errors in x. As
usual, we compute the column checksums matrix
C = (W⊺A)
⊺
,
and then compare the two entries of C⊺x ∈ R2 with the weighted sums
y˜c1 =
n∑
i=1
y˜i
and
y˜c2 =
n∑
i=1
iy˜i
where y˜ is the possibly faulty vector computed by the algorithm. It is clear
that if no error occurs, the computation verifies the condition δ = y˜c − c = 0.
Furthermore, if exactly one error occurs, we have δ1, δ2 6= 0 and
δ2
δ1
∈ N, and if
two errors strike the vectors protected by the checksum c, the algorithm is able
to detect them by verifying that δ 6= 0.
At this point it is natural to ask whether this information is enough to build
a working algorithm or some border cases can bias its behavior. In particular,
when δ2
δ1
= p ∈ N, it is not clear how to discern between single and double
errors. Let ε1, ε2 ∈ R \ {0} be the value of two errors occurring at position p1
and p2 respectively, and let y˜ ∈ R
n be such that
y˜i =

yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= p1, p2
yi + ε1, i = p1
yi + ε2, i = p2
.
Then the conditions
δ1 = ε1 + ε2, (6)
δ2 = p1ε1 + p2ε2, (7)
hold. Therefore, if ε1 and ε2 are such that
p (ε1 + ε2) = p1ε1 + p2ε2, (8)
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it is not possible to distinguish these two errors from a single error of value
ε1 + ε2 occurring in position p. This issue can be solved by introducing a new
set of weights and hence a new row of column checksums. Let us consider a
weight matrix Ŵ ∈ Rn×3 that includes a quadratic weight vector
Ŵ =

1 1 1
1 2 4
1 3 9
...
...
...
1 n n2
 ,
and the tridimensional vector
δˆ =
(
Ŵ⊺A
)
x− Ŵ⊺y˜ ,
whose components can be expressed as
δ1 = ε1 + ε2
δ2 = p1ε1 + p2ε2
δ2 = p
2
1ε1 + p
2
2ε2 .
To be confused with a single error in position p, ε1 and ε2 have to be such that
p (ε1 + ε2) = p1ε1 + p2ε2
and
p2 (ε1 + ε2) = p
2
1ε1 + p
2
2ε2
hold simultaneously for some p ∈ N. In other words, possible values of the
errors are the solution of the linear system(
(p− p1) (p− p2)
(p2 − p21) (p
2 − p22)
)(
ε1
ε2
)
=
(
0
0
)
.
It is easy to see that the determinant of the coefficient matrix is
(p− p1) (p− p2) (p2 − p1) ,
which always differs from zero, as long as p, p1 and ps differ pairwise. Thus,
the matrix is invertible, and the solution space of the linear system is the trivial
kernel (ε1, ε2) = (0, 0). Thus using Ŵ as weight matrix guarantees that it is
always possible to distinguish a single error from double errors.
5 Performance model
In Section 5.1, we introduce the general performance model. Then in Section 5.2
we instantiate it for the three methods that we are considering, namely Online-
Detection, ABFT-Detection and ABFT-Correction.
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5.1 General approach
We introduce an abstract performance model to compute the best combination
of checkpoints and verifications for iterative methods. We execute T time-units
of work followed by a verification, which we call a chunk, and we repeat this
scheme s times, i.e., we compute s chunks, before taking a checkpoint. We say
that the s chunks constitute a frame. The whole execution is then partitioned
into frames. We assume that checkpoint, recovery and verification are error-free
operations. Let Tcp, Trec and Tverif be the respective cost of these operations.
Finally, assume an exponential distribution of errors and let q be the probability
of successful execution for each chunk: q = e−λT , where λ is the fault rate.
The goal of this section is to compute the expected time E (s, T ) needed to
execute a frame composed of s chunks of size T . We derive the best value of s as a
function of T and of the resilience parameters Tcp, Trec, Tverif , and q, the success
probability of a chunk. Each frame is preceded by a checkpoint, except maybe
the first one (for which we recover by reading initial data again). Following
earlier work [36], we derive the following recursive equation to compute the
expected completion time of a single frame:
E (s, T ) = qs(s(T + Tverif )) + Tcp)
+ (1− qs) (E (Tlost) + Trec + E (s, T )) .
(9)
Indeed, the execution is successful if all chunks are successful, which happens
with probability qs, and in this case the execution time simply is the sum of
the execution times of each chunk plus the final checkpoint. Otherwise, with
probability 1− qs, we have an error, which we detect after some time E (Tlost),
and that forces us to recover (in time Trec) and restart the frame anew, hence
in time E (s, T ). The difficult part is to compute E (Tlost).
For 1 ≤ i ≤ s, let fi be the following conditional probability:
fi = P(error strikes at chunk i|there is
an error in the frame) . (10)
Given the success probability q of a chunk, we obtain that
fi =
qi−1(1− q)
1− qs
.
Indeed, the first i− 1 chunks were successful (probability qi−1), the ith one had
an error (probability 1 − q), and we condition by the probability of an error
within the frame, namely 1 − qs. With probability fi, we detect the error at
the end of the ith chunk, and we have lost the time spent executing the first i
chunks. We derive that
E (Tlost) =
s∑
i=1
fi (i(T + Tverif )) .
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We have
∑s
i=1 fi =
(1−q)h(q)
1−qs where h(q) = 1 + 2q + 3q
2 + · · · + sqs−1. If
m(q) = q+q2+· · ·+qs = 1−q
s+1
1−q −1, we get by differentiation thatm
′(q) = h(q),
hence h(q) = −(s+1)q
s
1−q +
1−qs+1
(1−q)2 and finally
E (Tlost) = (T + Tverif )
sqs+1 − (s+ 1)qs + 1
(1− qs)(1 − q)
.
Plugging the expression of E (Tlost) back into (9), we obtain
E (s, T ) = s(T + Tverif )) + Tcp + (q
−s − 1)Trec
+ T
sqs+1 − (s+ 1)qs + 1
qs(1− q)
,
which simplifies into
E (s, T ) = Tcp + (q
−s − 1)Trec + (T + Tverif )
1− qs
qs(1− q)
.
We have to determine the value of s that minimizes the overhead of a frame:
s = argmin
s≥1
(
E (s, T )
sT
)
. (11)
The minimization is complicated and should be conducted numerically (because
T , the size of a chunk, is still unknown). Luckily, a dynamic programming
algorithm to compute the optimal value of T and s is available [9].
5.2 Instantiation to PCG
For each of the three methods, Online-Detection, ABFT-Detection and
ABFT-Correction, we instantiate the previous model and discuss how to
solve (11).
5.2.1 Online-Detection
For Chen’s method [6], we have chunks of d iterations, hence T = dTiter, where
Titer is the raw cost of a PCG iteration without any resilience method. The ver-
ification time Tverif is the cost of the orthogonality check operations performed
as described in Section 3. As for silent errors, the application is protected from
arithmetic errors in the ALU, as in Chen’s original method, but also for cor-
ruption in data memory (because we also checkpoint the matrix A). Let λa be
the rate of arithmetic errors, and λm be the rate of memory errors. For the
latter, we have λm = Mλword if the data memory consists of M words, each
susceptible to be corrupted with rate λword. Altogether, since the two error
sources are independent, they have a cumulative rate of λ = λa + λm, and the
success probability for a chunk is q = e−λT .
Plugging these values in (11) gives an optimization formula very similar to
that of Chen [6, Sec. 5.2], the only difference being that we assume that the
verification is error-free, which is needed for the correctness of the approach.
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5.2.2 ABFT-Detection
When using ABFT techniques, we detect possible errors every iteration, so a
chunk is a single iteration, and T = Titer . For ABFT-Detection, Tverif is
the overhead due to the checksums and redundant operations to detect a single
error in the method.
ABFT-Detection can protect the application from the same silent errors
as Online-Detection, and just as before the success probability for a chunk
(a single iteration here) is q = e−λT .
5.2.3 ABFT-Correction
In addition to detection, we now correct single errors at every chunk. Just as
for ABFT-Detection, a chunk is a single iteration, and T = Titer, but Tverif
corresponds to a larger overhead, mainly due to the extra checksums needed to
detect two errors and correct a single one.
The main difference lies in the error rate. An iteration withABFT-Correc-
tion is successful if zero or one error has struck during that iteration, so that the
success probability is much higher than for Online-Detection and ABFT-
Detection. We compute that value of the success probability as follows. We
have a Poisson process of rate λ, where λ = λa + λm as for Online-Detec-
tion and ABFT-Detection. The probability of exactly k errors in time T is
(λT )k
k! e
−λT [37], hence the probability of no error is e−λT and the probability of
exactly one error is λTe−λT , so that q = e−λT + λTe−λT .
6 Experiments
6.1 Setup
There are two different sources of advantages in combining ABFT and check-
pointing. First, the error detection capability lets us perform a cheap validation
of the partial result of each PCG step, recovering as soon as an error strikes.
Second, being able to correct single errors makes each step more resilient and
increases the expected number of consecutive valid iterations. We say an itera-
tion is valid if it is non-faulty, or if it suffers from a single error that is corrected
via ABFT.
For our experiments, we use a set of positive definite matrices from the UFL
Sparse Matrix Collection [38], with size between 17456 and 74752 and density
lower than 10−2. We perform the experiments under Matlab and use the fac-
tored approximate inverse preconditioners [16, 39] in the PCG. The application
of these preconditioners requires two SpMxV, which are protected against error
using the methods proposed in Section 4 (in all methods Online-Detection,
ABFT-Detection, and ABFT-Correction).
At each iteration of PCG, faults are injected during vector and matrix-vector
operations but, since we are assuming selective reliability, all the checksums and
checksum operations are considered non-faulty. Faults are modeled as bit flips
24
Table 2: Test matrices used in the experiments. Name and id are from the
University of Florida Sparse Matrix Collection.
name id size density steps residual
Boeing/bcsstk36 341 23052 2.15e-03 50 6.41e-04
Mulvey/finan512 752 74752 1.07e-04 25 2.19e-14
Andrews/Andrews 924 60000 2.11e-04 20 1.59e-04
GHS psdef/wathen100 1288 30401 5.10e-04 50 2.55e-13
GHS psdef/wathen120 1289 36441 4.26e-04 50 9.16e-14
GHS psdef/gridgena 1311 48962 2.14e-04 50 5.61e-05
GHS psdef/jnlbrng1 1312 40000 1.24e-04 50 5.83e-13
UTEP/Dubcova2 1848 65025 2.44e-04 50 1.16e-05
JGD Trefethen/Trefethen 20000 2213 20000 1.39e-03 10 6.00e-16
occurring independently at each step, under an exponential distribution of pa-
rameter λ, as detailed in Section 5.2. These bit flips can strike either the matrix
(the elements of Val ,Colid and Rowidx ), or any entry of the PCG vectors ri,
zi, q, pi or xi. We chose not to inject errors during the computation explic-
itly, as they are just a special case of error we are considering. Moreover, to
simplify the injection mechanism, Titer is normalized to be one, meaning that
each memory location or operation is given the chance to fail just once per iter-
ation [27]. Finally, to get data that are homogeneous among the test matrices,
the fault rate λ is chosen to be inversely proportional to M (memory size) with
a proportionality constant α ∈ (0, 1); this makes sense as larger the memory
used by an application, larger is the chance to have an error. It follows that the
expected number of PCG iterations between two distinct fault occurrences does
not depend either on the size or on the sparsity ratio of the matrix.
We compare the performance of three algorithms, namely Online-Detec-
tion, ABFT-Detection (single detection and rolling back as soon as an error
is detected), and ABFT-Correction (correcting single errors during a given
step and rolling back only if two errors strike a single operation). We instantiate
them by limiting the maximum number of PCG steps to 50 (20 for #924, whose
convergence is sublinear) and setting the tolerance parameter ǫ at line 5 of
Algorithm 1 to 10−14. The number of iterations for a non-faulty execution and
the achieved accuracy are detailed in Table 2.
Implementing the null checks in Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4
poses a challenge. The comparison dr = 0 is between two integers, and can
be correctly evaluated by any programming language using the equality check.
However, the other two, having floating point operands, are problematic. Since
the floating point operations are not associative and the distributive property
does not hold, we need a tolerance parameter that takes into account the round-
ing operations that are performed by each floating point operation. Here, we
give an upper bound on the difference between the two floating point checksums,
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using the standard model [40, Sec. 2.2] to make sure that errors caught by our
algorithms really are errors and not merely inaccuracies due to floating point
operations (which is tolerable, as non-faulty executions can give rise to the same
inaccuracy).
Theorem 3 (Accuracy of the floating point weighted checksums). Let A ∈
R
n×n, x ∈ Rn, c ∈ Rn. If all of the sums involved into the matrix operations
are performed using some flavor of recursive summation [40, Ch. 4], it holds
that
|fl ((c⊺A)x)− fl (c⊺ (Ax)) | ≤ 2 γ2n |c
⊺| | A | | x | . (12)
We refer the reader to the technical report for the proof [41, Theorem 2].
Let us note that if all of the entries of c are positive, as it is often the case in
our setting, the absolute value of c in (12) can be safely replaced with c itself.
It is also clear that these bounds are not computable, since c⊺ | A | | x | is
not, in general, a floating point number. This problem can be alleviated by
overestimating the bound by means of matrix and vector norms.
Since we are interested in actually computing the bound at runtime, we
consider a weaker bound. Recalling that [42, Sec. B.7]
‖A‖1 = max1≤j≤n
n∑
i=1
|ai,j |. (13)
we can upper bound the right hand side in so that
|fl ((c⊺A)x)− fl (c⊺ (Ax)) | ≤ 2 γ2n n ‖c
⊺‖∞ ‖A‖1 ‖x‖∞ . (14)
Though the right hand side of (14) is not exactly computable in floating point
arithmetic, it requires an amount of operations dramatically smaller than (12);
just a few sums for the norm of A. As this norm is usually computed using
the identity in (13), any kind of summation yields a relative error of at most
n′u [40, Sec. 4.6], where n′ is the maximum number of nonzeros in a column
of A, and u is the machine epsilon. Since we are dealing with sparse matrices,
we expect n′ to be very small, and hence the computation of the norm to be
accurate. Moreover, since the right hand side in (14) does not depend on x, it
can be computed just once for a given matrix and weight vector.
Clearly, using (14) as tolerance parameter guarantees no false positive (a
computation without any error that is considered as faulty), but allows false
negatives (an iteration during which an error occurs without being detected)
when the perturbations of the result are small. Nonetheless, this solution works
almost perfectly in practice, meaning that though the convergence rate can
be slowed down, the algorithms still converges towards the “correct” answer.
Though such an outcome could be surprising at first, Elliott et al. [43, 44]
showed that bit flips that strike the less significant digits of the floating point
representation of vector elements during a dot product create small perturba-
tions of the results, and that the magnitude of this perturbation gets smaller as
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Table 3: Experimental validation of the model. Here s˜i and s
∗
i represent the best
checkpointing interval according to our model and to our simulations respec-
tively, whereas Et (s˜i) and Et (s
∗
i ) stand for the execution time of the algorithm
using these checkpointing intervals.
id s˜1 Et (s˜1) s
∗
1 Et (s
∗
1) l1 s˜2 Et (s˜2) s
∗
2 Et (s
∗
2) l2
341 4 305.42 1 293.22 4.16 4 305.45 1 293.16 4.19
752 30 13.81 24 13.34 3.57 24 12.17 23 11.93 2.01
924 23 49.82 30 47.53 4.82 23 44.52 26 42.42 4.96
1288 22 11.12 19 10.82 2.72 22 11.32 19 11.03 2.58
1289 16 16.56 13 16.38 1.07 23 13.49 23 13.49 0.00
1311 4 216.70 1 207.97 4.19 4 220.20 1 208.19 5.77
1312 25 14.41 22 13.86 3.97 23 12.30 22 12.06 1.96
1848 4 321.70 1 309.28 4.01 4 366.03 1 314.20 16.49
2213 19 2.31 12 2.19 5.58 24 2.33 23 2.20 5.94
the size of the vectors increases. Hence, we expect errors that are not detected
by our tolerance threshold to be too small to impact the solution of the linear
solver.
6.2 Simulations
To validate the model, we perform the simulation whose results are illustrated
in Table 3. For each matrix, we set λ = 116 M and consider the average execution
time of 100 repetitions of both ABFT-Detection (columns 5-8) and ABFT-
Correction (columns 6-9). In the table we record the checkpointing interval
s∗i which achieves the shortest execution time Et (s
∗
1), and the checkpointing
interval s˜i which is the best stepsize according to our method, along with its
execution time Et (s˜i). Finally, we evaluate the performance of our guess by
means of the quantity
li =
Et (s˜i)− Et (s
∗
i )
Et (s∗i )
· 100 ,
that expresses the loss, in terms of execution time, of executing with the check-
pointing interval given by our model with respect to the best possible choice.
From the table, we clearly see that the values of s˜i and s
∗
i are close, since the
time loss reaches just above 5% for l1 and just below 15% for l2. This sometimes
poor result depends just on the small number of repetitions we are considering,
that leads to the presence of outliers, lucky runs in which a small number of
errors occur and the computation is carried on in a much quicker way. Similar
results hold for other values of λ.
We also compare the execution time of the three algorithms to empirically
asses how much their relative performance depend on the fault rate. The results
on our test matrices are shown in Fig. 1, where the y-axis is the execution time
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Figure 1: Execution time in seconds (y axis) of Online-Detection (dotted),
ABFT-Detection (solid line) andABFT-Correction (dashed) with respect
to the normalized MTBF (x-axis). The matrix number is in the subcaption.
28
(in seconds), and the x-axis is the normalized mean time between failure (the
reciprocal of α). Here, the larger x = 1
α
, the smaller the corresponding value
of λ = α
M
, hence the smaller the expected number of errors. For each value of
λ, we draw the average execution time of 50 runs of the three algorithms, using
the best checkpointing interval predicted in Section 5.1 for ABFT-Detection
and ABFT-Correction, and by Chen [6, Eq. 10] for Online-Detection.
In terms of execution time, Chen’s method is comparable to ours for middle to
high fault rates, since it clearly outperforms ABFT-Detection in five out of
nine cases, being slightly faster than ABFT-Correction for lower fault rates.
Intuitively, this behavior is not surprising. When λ is large, many errors
occur but, since α is between zero and one, we always have, in expectation, less
than one error per iteration. Thus ABFT-Correction requires fewer check-
points than ABFT-Detection and almost no rollback, and this compensates
for the slightly longer execution time of a single step. When the fault rate is very
low, instead, the algorithms perform almost the same number of iterations, but
ABFT-Correction takes slightly longer due to the additional dot products
at each step.
Altogether, the results show that ABFT-Correction outperforms both
Online-Detection and ABFT-Detection for a wide range of fault rates,
thereby demonstrating that combining checkpointing with ABFT correcting
techniques is more efficient than pure checkpointing for most practical situa-
tions.
7 Conclusion
We consider the problem of silent errors in iterative linear systems solvers. At
first, we focus our attention on ABFT methods for SpMxV, developing algo-
rithms able to detect and correct errors in both memory and computation using
various checksumming techniques. Then, we combine ABFT with replication,
in order to develop a resilient PCG kernel that can protect axpy’s and dot prod-
ucts as well. We also discuss how to take numerical issues into account when
dealing with actual implementations. These methods are a worthy choice for
a selective reliability model, since most of the operations can be performed in
unreliable mode, whereas only checksum computations need to be performed
reliably.
In addition, we examine checkpointing techniques as a tool to improve the
resilience of our ABFT PCG and develop a model to trade-off the checkpointing
interval so to achieve the shortest execution time in expectation. We implement
two of the possible combinations, namely an algorithm that relies on roll back
as soon as an error is detected, and one that is able to correct a single er-
ror and recovers from a checkpoint just when two errors strike. We validate
the model by means of simulations and finally compare our algorithms with
Chen’s approach, empirically showing that ABFT overhead is usually smaller
than Chen’s verification cost.
We expect this combined approach to be interesting for other variants of
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the preconditioned conjugate gradient algorithm [34]. Triangular precondition-
ers seem to be particularly attracting, in that it looks possible to treat them
by adapting the techniques described in this paper (Shantharam et al. [15] ad-
dressed the triangular case).
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